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Since the beginning of his third term as president, Putin has promoted the creation 
of the “Eurasian Union” as one of Russia’s major foreign policy goals. In fact, what 
Moscow wants to construct is not much a neo-Soviet project, as some of the propo-
nents of neo-Eurasianism assumed at the beginning of Putin’s tenure, but a sort of 
neo-imperial construction. It looks more similar to the European colonial empires of 
the 19th century, whereby the UK, France and other powers benefited economically 
from their colonial possessions. This model gave rise to resistance among the poten-
tial member states across the post-Soviet space, and Moscow has used a variety of 
methods to persuade and indeed compel the potential members of this neo-imperial 
project to join. Emigration is one of the key tools in this sense. The point here is that 
millions of workers come to Russia from impoverished Central Asian states. Tajiki-
stan is one of these states. Throughout 2013 Moscow has reiterated its threat to 
limit the numbers of guest workers from Tajikistan, or even to deport those already 
in Russia unless Dushanbe accepted Moscow’s demands. This approach works.
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Tajikistan, one of the poorest states in Central Asia, has a tense relationship with neighboring Uzbekistan and also faces a 
potential threat from Islamist radicals in Afghanistan. This threat 
will most likely increase after the withdrawal of U.S., and NATO 
forces from Afghanistan in 2014. Emomali Rakhmon, Tajiki-
stan’s president, has been in an ongoing search for geopolitical 
patron. While such diverse players as China, the U.S. and Iran 
are seen as potential patrons, it is Russia that looks like the more 
natural choice, able to shield Tajikistan from potential military 
threats. Russia is also a major source of hard currency, given 
that according the Russian Federal Migration Service’s 2013 
figures, there are approximately 1.11 million Tajiks working in 
Russia,1 sending considerable sums home to Tajikistan. The Tajik 
migrants have become Moscow’s trump card and after 
continued pressure, Dushanbe finally succumbed.  Re-
elected Rakhmon caved into Moscow’s demands to keep 
Russian bases open on Tajik territory practically free of 
charge.  At the same time, the migrant issue indicated that 
Moscow might well use the same tactic to deal with other 
former Soviet republics that send considerable numbers 
of migrants to Russia.
Background
Tajikistan seems to have had no problem in identifying potential 
patrons. Russia emerged as a sort of logical option.  This was not 
only due to the fact that Moscow had been Tajikistan’s imperial 
master for so long, but also because Russia employs thousands 
of Tajik Gastarbeiter who send millions of dollars home. In 2012 
alone, Tajik migrant workers sent 3.8 billion USD in remittances 
back home, up 31 percent year-on-year and equal to 47 percent of 
Tajikistan’s GDP.2 Finally, Russian troops play an important role 
in preventing the penetration of Islamists from the South.  Still, 
the relationship with Moscow was hardly harmonious, although 
it appears to have improved since the fall of 2012.  Dushanbe 
agreed to keep Russia’s military base for free in return for Mos-
cow’s implicit protection of the Rakhmon regime, and consider-
able economic and military assistance.  
Yet soon after acquiescing to Moscow’s demands, Rakhmon de-
clared that he did not see any true benefits in security arrange-
1В России работает более миллиона таджикских мигрантов – ФМС,(In Russia living more 
than a million Tajik worker) Tajik Portal, April 2013, available at http://tjk.rus4all.ru/city_
msk/20130408/723990951.html 
2 Tajik Migrants in Russia Send $3.8 Bln Home, Ria Novosti, 25 January 2013, available at  http://
en.ria.ru/world/20130125/179026395.html 
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ments with Russia’s sponsored military organization.  One might 
wonder about Dushanbe’s sudden change of heart. It appears il-
logical when we consider the threat posed by Afghanistan, espe-
cially after the departure of U.S. troops in 2014, together with the 
failure of negotiations with Uzbekistan on the water distribution 
problem.3 One of the major possible reasons that Rakhmon was 
displeased with Russia was Moscow’s statement that Russian 
forces in Tajikistan would not be engaged in the internal conflict 
in the country.4  This message was very likely unsettling for Ra-
khmon, who saw Moscow as the powerful “krysha” (roof) – i.e. 
protector of his regime.  
It is therefore unsurprising that Rakhmon decided that 
he needed to fend for himself, and looked for additional 
backup, as well as demanding more from the Kremlin. 
Consequently he demanded a dramatic increase in Rus-
sian investment, not just in Tajikistan’s hydro-electric 
project5 but also in other areas.  Dushanbe’s rancor was 
enhanced by the fact that Bishkek received more financial as-
sistance for its army.  Saimiddin Dustov, head of the Dushanbe-
based think tank Indem, complained, “The Kremlin does not ful-
fill its promises, and the Tajik authorities are not capable of de-
fending their national interests.”  He added that Tajik authorities 
are annoyed that Moscow appears to treat Dushanbe as a second 
class citizen, even within the context of Central Asia, claiming 
that Kyrgyzstan has received [or stands to receive] assistance 
from Russia to the tune of 1 billion USD for the deployment of 
Russian military base on its territory, five times more than what 
Tajikistan was offered [in technical assistance and equipment].”6 
By March 2013 the tension between Dushanbe and Moscow had 
heated up significantly. On March 15th, the Chief of Russian Gen-
eral Staff and the Minister of Defense of Tajikistan had discussed 
the October 2012 agreement between Putin and Rakhmon.7  The 
negotiations were apparently unsuccessful.  This led to the can-
cellation of the visit to Tajikistan by the First Vice-Premier of 
3 Sergei Kozhemiakin, “Spor iz-za vody prodolzhaetsia.  Uzbekistan i Tadzhikistan k soglasiiu ne 
prishli,” Central Asia.ru, 25 April, 2013.
4 “Tadzhikistan i Rossiia:  Druz’ia, soiuzniki, koloniia i metropoliia?,” Ozodagon, 22 Apreal, 2013.
5 Konstantin Parshin, “Tajikistan:  Is Dushanbe setting new conditions for Russia’s military 
presence?,” EurasiaNet.org, 5 April, 2013.
6 Konstantin Parshin, “Tadjikistan:  Is Moscow getting ready to punch Dushanbe?,” EurasiaNet.org, 
30 April, 2013.
7 “Nachal’nik Genshtaba VS Rossii obeshchal vmesti s Tadzhikistanom sokhranit’ mir v raione,” 
Fergana.ru, 15 March, 2013.
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Russia, Igor Shuvalov. 8  Moscow immediately retaliated by is-
suing threats.  Leonid Savin, an independent political observer, 
noted that if Rakhmon was going to create problems for Moscow, 
he could be replaced by a “more reasonable” person.  This could 
be justified to the West as “promoting democracy” and noted 
that Rakhmon should remember the fate of Kurmanbek Bakiev, 
the former Kyrgyz president who did not fit Moscow design and 
was ultimately ousted.9  Allusions to Bakiev’s removal were not 
accidental and some observers believed that Moscow is already 
preparing for Rakhmon’s removal, following a similar strategy to 
the one used for Bakiev.  
Thus: “Analysts in Moscow and Dushanbe are debat-
ing the implications of the media attacks.  Some believe 
that the press campaign should be seen by Rakhmon as 
a troubling omen, pointing out that the similar campaign 
against former Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiev 
in 2010 was accompanied by a Kremlin hike in energy 
tariffs.  Bakiev’s regime collapsed shortly after Russia 
imposed its tariff hike.”10  Russian observers noted that 
there are several ways to make Rakhmon more agreeable, 
or simply to remove him from office.  There was hint that 
Moscow could side with Uzbekistan in its conflict with 
Tajikistan over the flow of a river in the region.11  While 
this threat is apparently under consideration – Karimov and Putin 
met to demonstrate that the conflicts between them are not irrec-
oncilable – most Russian observers believed that it is economic 
pressure that would most likely make Rakhmon more pliable, or 
simply remove him from power.  Moscow was ready to take ac-
tion to destabilize the Rakhmon regime.
Implications
There are several ways in which Moscow has sought to create 
economic, and consequently political, problems for Rakhmon. 
Pundits have noted that the deterioration of the Moscow - Du-
shanbe relationship could well affect Russian involvement in 
Tajikistan’s major economic projects, such as building hydro 
8 “ ‘K’: Tadzhikistan podvodit rossiiskuiu bazu pod svoiu armiiu.  Rossii vydvinuty novye usloviia 
arendy,” CentralAsia.ru, 19 March, 2013.
9 “Nado li Rossii torgovat’sia s Tadzhikistanom is-za voennoi bazy:mneniia,” http://www.jarex.ru/
print/34917.html, 27 March, 2013.
10 Parshin, “Tajikistan:  Is Moscow getting ready to punch Dushanbe?,” EurasiaNet.org, 30, April, 
2013.
11 “Nado li Rossii torgovat’sia s Tadzhikistanom iz-za voennoi basy:mneniia,” 
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electric plants.  One Russian observer has commented that the 
Sangtudinskaia Power Station is “the only big Russio – Tadzhik 
project in Tajikistan.”  The station could be forced to close down 
because it has not received payment for the electricity it has sold 
to various companies,12 and at least in April 2013, Moscow im-
plied that it would not do anything to help Dushanbe avoid this 
outcome.  The fact that Iran was a major sponsor of the project 
was conveniently overlooked by Russian commentators.   
In addition, Moscow, following its old practice, found 
problems with imported Tajikistan goods.  “Already, 
according to some media reports, Moscow is pulling a 
‘soft power’ lever, namely city governments across Rus-
sia have reportedly stopped accepting shipments of Tajik 
fruits and vegetables.”13   The most serious threat is to 
create problems for Tajikistan’s gastarbeiter in Russia, 
first raised in March of 2013 when an independent Rus-
sian analyst noted that Tajikistan, more than any other 
country in Central Asia, needs to maintain a good rela-
tionship with Moscow because “around million Tajiks (1/8 of the 
entire population) is in Russia.”  By April 2013, the threat was 
more pronounced: Vladimir Zhirinovskii, a nationalist MP of the 
Duma (Russian Parliament) stated that if Russia deported Tajik 
migrants, Tajikistan would be in the hands of Islamists.14  The 
implication is that Tajikistan is barely holding ground right now 
with millions of dollars being sent home from Russia by Tajiks 
workers.  If millions of unemployed and embittered men are re-
turned, the economy and the social structure would collapse, and 
Islamists will take advantage of those conditions.  
Zhirinovsky was not the only one who has threatened to create 
problems for Tajik migrants.  Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime 
Minister of Russia and in charge of the defense industry, also 
warned that Kremlin would make it hard for Tajiks to enter Rus-
sia, and many have implied that the collapse of Tajikistan econ-
omy and society would not just remove Rakhmon from power, 
but would endanger his very physical survival.15  Two of Rus-
sia’s leading nationalist gadflies – vice premier Dmitry Rognozin 
12 “ ‘AP’: Tadzhikistan-Rossiia.  Vremia platit’ po shchetam…,” CentralAsia.ru, 26 April, 2013.
13 Parshin, “Tadjikistan: Is Moscow getting ready to punish Dushanbe?,” EurasiaNet.org, 30, April, 
2013.
14 “Shli by Vy v/na…MID Rossii vezhlivo otvetil na notu Tadzhikskoi storony,” CentralAsia.ru, 26 
April, 2013.
15 “A. Sarkorova:  Duzhanbe vozmushchen vyskazyvaniiami rosiiskikh politikov,” CentralAsia.ru, 
25 April, 2013.
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and the State Duma’s vice speaker and Liberal Demo-
cratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky – have led the 
chorus of criticism of Tajikistan.  Both have played up 
the need for Russia to introduce a visa regime for Cen-
tral Asian labor migrants, especially those from Tajiki-
stan.  Zhirinovsky was especially blunt in his threats.  In 
comments broadcast on the state television channel RTR 
on April 18, Zhirinovsky castigated Tajik authorities for 
delaying the ratification of the military base deal, hint-
ing that President Imomali Rahkmon’s administration 
was simply trying to wangle money out of the Russian 
government.  Zhirinovsky also cautioned Rakhmon that 
in playing games with Russia, he was playing with fire. 
If Dushanbe lacked Russia’s backing, he warned, “Af-
ghan Islamists would overrun Tajikistan, and they would 
hang him (Rakhmon) in the center of Dushanbe, like they 
did with Najibullah [the former Afghan communist-era 
leader].”16    
Following this direct threat, some Russian observers also not-
ed that Rakhmon’s rule could end badly, and that it was none 
other but Putin who had warned Rakhmon about the instability 
of his leadership in the case of social / political shakeup, dur-
ing an October 2012 visit.  Moscow has signaled that it is ready 
to act and that public opinion is behind possible action against 
Tajikistan migrants.  Russian authorities have provided a variety 
of justifications for this action.  Already in April 2013, Russia 
claimed that Tajikistan is a hotbed of terrorism, posing a risk to 
Russian territory.17  This allegation was accepted by the public 
and in Moscow “a series of small demonstrations in cities on 
April 14 echoed the call for stricter migration controls for la-
bor migrants.”18  The incitement of anti-migrant feelings – either 
against “Caucasians” or Central Asians – is easy; such attitudes 
are fairly common among Russians.  
Russia’s threats were not empty ones.  Russian authorities sought 
to create problems for Tajik trains transiting Russian territory.19 
“An April 23 roundtable discussion, broadcast by the Rossiya 
16 Konstantin Parshin, “Tajikistan: Is Moscow getting ready to punish Dushanbe?” EurasiaNet.org, 
30 April, 2013.
17 “S. Bochkov: Rossiia plius Tadzhikistan – novyi kanal perepravki boevikov,” CentralAsia.ru, 11 
April, 2013.
18 Parshin, “Tajikistan:  Is Moscow getting ready to punish Dushanbe?” EurasiaNet.org, 30 April, 
2013.
19 Pairav Chorshanbiev, “Rossiia khochet vytesnit’ Tadzhikistan s rynka zheleznodorozhnykh uslug,” 
news.tj, 23 April, 2013.
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channel, featured a mini-documentary called ‘Shaitan-train’, ex-
amining the operations of trains connecting Dushanbe and Mos-
cow.  Panelists then expressed critical views about the existing 
labor migration practices and piled in with calls for a stronger 
visa regime.”20  One of the proposals was to allow Tajiks to enter 
Russia by using different type of passport.  The point here is that 
Tajiks, similar to Russians, have two types of passport.  One is 
for domestic use and the other for international travel.  Citizens 
have to apply for the international passport, which is a cumber-
some and expensive process.  Some Russian officials have pro-
posed that Tajiks should be required to show a foreign passport 
to enter Russia,21 which would significantly complicate travel to 
Russia.  
In addition to its arsenal of political and economic threats, 
Moscow has tried to employ carrots, or at least promise 
of carrots.  During the May 2013 meeting between Ra-
khmon and Putin, Putin hinted that trade between Rus-
sia and Tajikistan could be increased.22  Nonetheless, the 
meeting did not yield any tangible results, despite Putin’s 
belief that Rakhmon would speed up the ratification of 
the fall 2012 treaty on the conditions for the Russian base 
in Tajikistan.23  This led to new array of negative articles 
from May to July of 2013 in the Russian media on how 
poor, corrupt and fundamentally unstable Tajikistan is. 
According to the contributors, the Tajikistan economy 
faces absolute failure, as demonstrated by the problems with the 
construction of Rogun hydro station.  According to them, while 
the government collected considerable sums from the popula-
tion, it remains unable to complete Rogun.24  
As a matter of fact, the observers asserted Rogun should never be 
built because its operation would irreversibly damage the envi-
ronment.25  One might add here that construction work for Rogun 
20  Parshin, “Tajikistan:  Is Moscow getting ready to punish Dushanbe?,” EurasiaNet.org, 30, April, 
2013.
21 M. Beliakov, ” Zloveshchie podarki iz Tadzhikistana,” CentralAsia.ru, 16 May, 2013.
22 “Rakhmon poprosil Putina byt’ vnimatel’nei k Tsentral’noi Azii,” Islam News, 28 May, 2013.
23 “Putin i Rakhmon obsudiat voprosy voennoii pomoshchi Tadzhikistanu,” Islam News, 28 May, 
2013.
24 “Tadzh Vlasti natriasli s naseleniia $200 millionov za aktsii Roguna,” CentralAsia.ru, 26 July, 
2013; “Economist:  Tadzhikistan nesposoben v odinochku postroit’ Rogunskuiu GES,” CentralAsi.
rua, 26 July, 2013.  
25 A. Odeberdiev, “Dutye dostoinstva i real’nye ugrozy Rogunskoi GES,” CentralAsia.ru, 1 August, 
2013.
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was practically stopped by 2012.26  The Tajik population was lit-
erally starving, noted the observers.  Indeed, it was dire poverty 
which pushed traditional Tajik women to engage in prostitution, 
which is now spreading in Tajikistan.27  Together with prostitu-
tion, Tajikistan is a hotbed of dangerous pandemic diseases28 
and drug trafficking.29  The Russian press also pressed the point 
that it is not just Moscow that regards Dushanbe as the source of 
drug and human trafficking but also international organizations.30 
While the Tajik population suffers from disease, crime and Is-
lamic extremism have flourished.  Indeed, while the population 
is starving, the local administrations engage in PR-type projects 
costing huge amounts of money.31  
This corrupt society is reinforced by authoritarian system with 
leader who is clinging to power regardless.  Indeed, Rakhmon 
want to imitate the authoritarian leaders in the area.  He deals 
brutally with any opposition and wants to be president for life.32 
It is clear, as observers implied, that Tajikistan is actually a fail-
ing state unable to resist any external threat, with its army resem-
bling bands of hungry ragamuffins with outdated weapons.33  It 
was implied here that the Rakhmon regime is extremely unstable 
and that it would not take much to ensure the regime’s downfall. 
Consequently potential problems with Tajik migrants in Russia 
could have devastating implications for Dushanbe. Moscow is 
quite ready to take a step in this direction, and not just because 
of the problems with Dushanbe but also due to the problems 
with migrant workers from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which, 
according to these observers, present the most serious danger 
for Russia.34  All of these publications convey Moscow’s clear 
26 “Stroika veka Rogun prevrashchaetsia v sekretnyi ob’ekt,” http://www.avesta.tj/rogun/13259-
stroyka-veka-rogun-prevraschaetsya-v-sekretnyi-obekt..., 23 July, 2012.
27 Makhropa Kiromova, “V Tadzhikistane rastet chislo prostitutok,” CentralAsia.ru, 27 July, 2013. 
28 “Na severe Tadzhikistana shiritsia epidemiia sibirskoi iazvy,” CentralAsia.ru, 17, July, 2013; R. 
Samiev, “Tadzhikskie deti stradaiut ot neizvestnoi bolezni,” CentralAsia.ru, 29 July, 2013.
29 M. Beliakov, “Zloveshchie podarki iz Tadzhikistana,” Central Asia.ru, 16 May, 2013.
30  D. Inomzoda,”Molodoe podspor’e ‘dzhikhadistov’ v Tadzhikistane,” CentralAsia.ru, 20 July, 
2013; B. Sokiev, “Pravitil’stvo Tadzhikistana ozabocheno rostom ekstrimizma v strane,” CentralAsia.
ru, 1 August, 2013.
31 “Blesk nishchety.  Gissarskaia meriia zakazala tadzhiuveliram napol’nye chasy s 3 tys. ametistov, 
tsenoi $600 tys,” CentralAsia.ru, 18 July, 2013.
32 “Chem Emomali ne Gurbanguly. Prezident Tadzhikistana gotovit sebia k pozhiznennomy 
prezidentstvu,” CentralAsia.ru, 20 July, 2013; M. Saidkhodzhaev, “Tadzhikskaia al’ternativa – 
propravitel’stvennye zombi protiv politicheskikh trupov,” CentralAsia.ru, 22 July, 2013.
33 S. Asomiddinov, “Tadzhikistan.  Golodnyi shchit gosudarstva,” CentralAsia.ru, 22 July, 2013.
34 S. Pirov, “Migratsionnye protsessy v Tadzhikistane ugrozhaiut stranam SNG,” Central Asia.ru, 3 
July, 2013.
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displeasure with Dushanbe, and demonstrate the Kremlin’s clear 
intention to use a variety of means to express this, most notably 
by targeting the migrant workers as a means to pressure, or if 
necessary, to destabilize the regime. 
Dushanbe has responded to this by increasing its flirtations 
with China and the West.  Dushanbe has focused on its relation-
ship with China as a major source of cash.  In May 2013, Ra-
khmon visited China, and following negotiations, the Chinese 
side agreed to invest 300 million USD in Tajikistan.35 Both the 
Chinese and Tajikistan leadership are designing plans to further 
develop the China – Tajikistan relationship until 2019, and have 
proclaimed that China and Tajikistan will develop their relation-
ship to “strategic level.”36 
This trajectory has made Moscow quite unhappy, and 
various articles published in June and July 2013 demon-
strate this.  In the view of Russian media commentators, 
China is Tajikistan’s last hope, as no other countries are 
interested in investing in such a corrupt place.37  Still, as 
suggested, the Chinese will likely soon lose interest, at 
which point dysfunctional Tajikistan would finally col-
lapse.38  The catastrophic scenario of Tajikistan’s coop-
eration with China has also been elaborated.  According to that 
view, Chinese “migrational invasions” could lead to the displace-
ment of the native population, turning Tajikistan into a desert. 
Indeed, these articles have drawn implicit comparisons between 
the Chinese and locusts, suggesting that Chinese migrants would 
cause environmental damage.39  
Other media commentators have suggested that China could help 
the Tajik regime, though at a price – namely the transformation 
of Tajikistan’s infrastructure in a way that would boost economic 
development in China’s raw material appendix.40  China is not 
35 V. Panfilova, “Dushanbe beret kurs na Pekin. Tadzhikistan sdelal vybor v pol’zu sotrudnichestva s 
Kitaem,” Central Asia.ru, 22 May, 2013.
36 “Rakhmon vyklianchil v Pekine obeshchanie gumpomoshchi 32 mln.  za sdachu ostatkov 
Murgabskogo raiona,” Central Asia.ru, 20 May, 2013.
37 G. Akramshoev, “V boi idut odni kitaitsy. Iranskii biznes pokidaet Tadzhikistan,” CentralAsia.ru, 
16 July, 2013.
38 P. Mullodzhanov, “Spasut li tadzhikov Kitai s Rossiei, ili komu my nuzhny, krome samikh sebia?,” 
CentralAsia.ru, 18 July, 2013.
39 Salokiddin Sadriddinzoda, “Tadzhikistan – kto prikhodit za rabotoi i ukhodit s oslom,” Central 
Asia, 12 August, 2013.
40 A. Mustov, “Tadzhikistan prevrashchaetsia v syr’evoi pridatok Kitaia?,” CentralAsia.ru, 22 July, 
2013.
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seen by observers as  Tajikistan’s only possible alternative. Iran, 
with which Tajikistan shares a common ethnic and cultural heri-
tage, has been posited as another option.  Iran has been engaged 
in various forms of cooperation with Tajikistan for awhile.  For 
example, Iran was involved in building the Sangtudinskaia Hy-
droelectric Station (GES)-2 and with plans to build other similar 
stations. This was, at least, the case several years ago41 and Teh-
ran does seem interested in developing a commercial relation-
ship with Dushanbe.42  This direction also displeases Moscow, 
whose relationship with Tehran is not an easy one.  In the view of 
Russian observers, Iran’s interest in Tajikistan is waning because 
it is impossible to pursue a normal business relationship with 
Dushanbe.43  The other interpretation suggested that Tajikistan 
would be absorbed by Iran, at least indirectly.44  Yet another view 
argues that Dushanbe’s economic cooperation with Tehran is es-
sentially meaningless for Sangtudinskaia GES-2, given that  the 
project remains unfinished despite Iranian promises.45 
While China is clearly seen as the major source of cash 
and help from Iran is also taken into account, it should 
also be recalled that Dushanbe has not turned its back 
entirely on the West and has cooperated with NATO and 
the U.S. for over a decade.  Since 2001, the “engineer-
ing troops for support or NATO forces which comprise 
300 French military personnel” have been stationed in 
Dushanbe.46  The USA also invested considerable sums 
in strengthening Tajikistan borders.  In 2012, the French 
delegation visited Tajikistan and signed an agreement to 
the effect that French forces would remain in Afghanistan 
even after NATO’s withdrawal at the end of 2014.  In 
the same year, a “huge training center for Tajikistan servicemen” 
was launched.47 It was financed by the U.S., and entailed a part-
nership between Tajikistan and NATO.  In April 2013, the NATO 
41 “Tadzhikskie i iranskie energetiki rassmatrivaiut tekhnicheskie parametry proekta stroitel’stva GES 
‘Aini’,” Iran News, 29 August, 2012.
42 “V Dushanbe proshla vstrecha delovykh krugov Tadzhikistana i Irana,” Iran News, 16 September, 
2013.
43 “Iranskaia kompaniia obviniaet ‘Tadzhik-Eir’,” CentralAsia.ru, 7 July, 2013.
44 P. Romanov, “Tadzhikistan v ozhidanii novogo vitka iranskoi ekspansii,” CentralAsia.ru, 22 July, 
2013.  On the critic of this view, see “D. Pano:  Terra incognito.  Iran i Tadzhikistan (polemika S P. 
Romanovym),” CentralAsia.ru, 22 July, 2013.
45 “Sangtudinskuiu GES-2 planiruiut zapustit’ v kontse goda,” Central Asia.ru, 12 August, 2013.
46 S. Kozhemiakin, “Tadzhikistan. Opasnyi kurs lavirovaniia,” Pravda, 8 August, 2013.
47 A. Muminov, “Bluzhdaiushchaia baza Manas perekochuet v Kazakhstan?” kursiv.kz, 23 August, 
2013.
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General Secretary visited Tajikistan and reaffirmed the NATO / 
Tajikistan relationship. Lately there have been rumors that al-
though the “U.S. is to close its base in ‘Manas’ (Kyrgyzstan), it 
could well reopen a similar base in Tajikistan.”48 
In the scope of its flirtations with a variety of partners, Dushanbe 
has become enterprising.  For example, an airfield in Aini has 
been promised to Russia, UK, the U.S. and even India, and the 
negotiations with all of these partners are likely to continue 
through July 2013.49  Some observers believed that India might 
just be an intermediary.  Under that scenario, India, upon receiv-
ing the base from Russia, would deliver it to NATO.50  Some be-
lieved that Rakhmon has already made up his mind and received 
assurance from Washington of its support.51  This notion appears 
quite plausible if one remembers that Rakhmon held talks with a 
high-ranking American general in late July 2013 and demanded 
and received payment for using the “okno” (window) station that 
provided the Russian military with the means to monitor practi-
cally any object in the Earth’s orbit.52  Finally, in August 2013, 
Tajikistan engaged in NATO / Kazakhstan-sponsored military 
maneuvers in Kazakhstan.53  
All of these foreign policy moves clearly irritate Putin, who ap-
parently invited Rakhmon to visit Moscow on August 1, 2013. 
The negotiations were inconclusive, and Russia’s response to 
Rakhmon’s visit was rather skeptical.  Centrist newspaper Ne-
zavisimaia Gazeta noted that Rakhmon came to Moscow empty-
handed54 and he should understand that a “multi vector” foreign 
policy is for “clever and strong” leaders – a category into which 
he definitely does not fall.55 The Kremlin implicitly warned that 
the attempt to engage with NATO / the U.S. on one hand and 
China and Iran – the U.S./ NATO enemy – on the other could 
lead not just to a foreign policy debacle but to the collapse of 
the regime.56  The contributor to the newspaper implied that Ra-
48 Ibid.
49 “Britanskii lev prygnul na Kaspii,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 1, July, 2013.
50 V. Panfilova, “Moskva zhdet iasnosti ot Bishkeka i Dushanbe,” Central Asia.ru, 29 May, 2013.
51 Arkadii Dubnov, “Evraziistvo nachinaet nabukhat’”; Novoi-Kazakhstan, 15 May, 2013,
52 Khamid Abdulloev, “ ‘Okno’ obizali platit’ nalogi,” Ozodagon, 26 July, 2013.
53 “Kazakhstan, NATO provodiat sovmestnye mirotvorcheskie ucheniia ‘Stepnoi orel – 2013’,” 
Fergnaa, 14 August, 2013.
54 “Rakhmon privez Putinu ocherednye obeshchaniia,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 2 August, 2010.
55 “SShA moderniziruet armiiu Tadzhikista,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 31 July, 2013.
56 Kozhemiakin, “Tadzhikistan Opasnyi kurs lavirovaniia.”
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khmon needs to understand that his position is extremely pre-
carious. It was not just the rumors about a war with Uzbekistan57 
over plans to regulate the flow of water58 but appalling domestic 
economic conditions which Russian commentators presented as 
evidence.  The stream of articles – either written by Russian au-
thors or taken from foreign sources – are intended to demonstrate 
the dire conditions in the country.  According to these observers, 
the state coffers are pretty much empty, which has pushed the 
government to increase taxation.59 The dearth of employment op-
portunities has meant very few of the Tajiks who study abroad 
are returning home.60 
Thus, Tajikistan is in dire straits economically, and aside 
from the money sent by migrant workers in Russia, there 
are no other sources of cash.61  And Tajiks have no place 
to go beside Russia. Indeed, observers have noted that 
the current economic conditions have led to an exodus 
to Russia not just by men but also women, which is quite 
unusual for Tajikistan.62  The role of migrants has become 
so important for the economy that the Tajik authorities classified 
the amount of money which migrant workers send back; figures 
are not made public.63  Nonetheless, they cannot hide the fact that 
migrants send considerable sums back to Tajikistan and that this 
line of cash inflow is a major crutch for the economy.64  
It is also noted by observers that Dushanbe is wrong to assume 
that Tajik migrants are of any importance for Russia.  They actu-
ally create a problem.  Indeed, as Russian observers noted, they 
have actually created problems in Moscow’s dealings with the 
West.  According to these observers, Russia has actually done Ta-
jikistan a favor.  The point here, insist the observers, is that Rus-
sia is in the process of negotiating changes in visa requirements 
57 “Rakhmon ishchet podderzhki Putina,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 29 July, 2013
58 “M. Opazgulyevi Rogunskaia GES.  Ne myt’em, tak katan’em,” CentralAsia.ru, 23 August, 2013; 
“ ‘DW’: Tadzhikistan delaet stavku na ‘vodnuiu diplomatiiu’,” CentralAsia.ru, 23 August, 2013.
59 “ Svadebnykh pevtsov v Tadzhikistane oblozhili ezhemesiachnym nalogom v razmere $113,” 
Aziia-Pluis, 21 August, 2013.
60 Shakhodat Shaibnazarova, “IWPR:  Obrazovatel’nyi defitsit v Tadzhikistane,” Inozpress.kg, 20 
August, 2013.
61 Sukhrob Shamolov, “Tadzhikistan – odna nadezhda na denezhnye perevody migrantov,” 
CentralAsia.ru, 21 August, 2013.
62 Ibid.
63 G. Faskhutdinov, “Tadzhikistan – den’gi migrantov pod grifom ‘sekretno’,” CentralAsia.ru, 7 
August, 2013.
64 B. Seidakhmetov, “Tadzhkistan v ozhidanii oseni,” CentralAsia.ru, 3 August, 2013.
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with the EU and the U.S.  According to some Russian 
analysts, the future agreements could well make it easier 
for Russians to travel to the West.  Thus in this sense, the 
presence of Tajik and other Central Asian migrants could 
complicate the issue from the perspective of Western 
powers, who do not want to see Russia becoming a tran-
sit route for Central Asian migrants into the West.  Rus-
sia allows Tajiks to move to Russia freely only because 
Dushanbe promised to allow Russia to have a military 
base in Tajikistan, according to agreement signed by Ra-
khmon and Putin in fall 2012.65  
Pro-government news agency Regnum also noted that the for-
mer Soviet republics who encourage their citizens to go to Rus-
sia should remember that Russia is under no obligation to ac-
cept them, and that being in Russia is a privilege.  Moreover, the 
number of migrants in Russia would decline if visa agreements 
are signed, and only those countries that belong to the so-called 
Eurasian Union, or at least have a good relationship with Russia, 
would be allowed to send migrants to Russia.  Another Russian 
observer noted ominously that “Rakhmon is aware that if Russia 
loses its patience and sends back several planes full of deported 
Tajiks, it would lead to chaos in Dushanbe.”66  
It is clear that Kremlin does not trust Rakhmon’s assur-
ances. Beyond the threats issued following Rakhmon’s 
visit. Moscow decided to pursue a broad policy of de-
porting at least a thousand illegal immigrants.67  There 
were several reasons behind this.  The large numbers of 
migrants became the symbol of all the ills of post-Soviet 
society and the dramatic changes in the demographic and 
cultural landscape of the country.  Immigrants from Cau-
casus and Central Asia constitute the vast majority of im-
migrants, and are the target of prejudice and hatred from 
ethnic Russians.  In early August 2013, soon after Putin’s 
meeting with Rakhmon, the Russian authorities appeared 
to decide to tackle the problem in earnest.  There is a 
plan to build 83 camps for illegal immigrants in Russia, 
where they shall be detained and then deported.  One of 
65 E. Chernenko, “Tadzhikistan poluchil rossiiskuiu notu v Facebook.  MID obespokoen 
bezopasnost’iu posol’stva v Dushanbe,” Komersant, 17 August, 2013.
66 I. Varfolomeeva, “Tadzhikskii tupik.  Kreml’ nedovolen Rakhmonom,” forum-msk.org, 18 August, 
2013.
67 Москва и Петербург повышают штрафы для мигрантов-нарушителей, Ria Novosti, August 
2013, available athttp://ria.ru/society/20130809/955233827.html
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them has already been built in Moscow.68  While the creation of 
the camps and the arrests of thousands of immigrants do not ex-
clusively target Tajiks, the authorities clearly perceive this new 
policy as the way to pressure Tajikistan along with – indirectly 
- the other countries of Central Asia and Caucuses. As a matter 
of fact, Russian authorities have already deported 3,000 migrants 
in last half year and prevented the entry of 17,000.69  Some of 
the deported were Tajiks and current policies of arresting and de-
porting Tajiks are quite similar to actions undertaken by Kremlin 
several years ago in retaliation to Dushanbe’s arrest of a Russian 
pilot.70  The deportations led to protests among the large Tajik 
diaspora in Russia whose representatives noted that the very no-
tion of “illegal migrants” should not be applied to Tajiks, or other 
citizens of the countries of the former USSR with which Russia 
has a visa free arrangement.71  
Nonetheless, the Kremlin has indicated that it could end 
these arrangements and deport thousands of Tajiks and 
possibly other nationals whose governments have been 
in conflict with Moscow. This could exacerbate the eco-
nomic, social and political problems in those countries. 
The withdrawal of Russian support and, especially, the 
problem with migrants, could cause Rakhmon’s down-
fall.  Indeed, in addition to the threat to limit the number 
of Tajik migrants, the Kremlin has attacked Rakhmon 
personally,  implicitly mocking his attempts to be seen 
as a serious historian,72 and implying that he and his rela-
tives are involved in drug trafficking.73  All of these sig-
nals from Moscow indicated that Moscow continues to be irritat-
ed with Dushanbe and is consider how to manipulate Rakhmon 
in line with its policy needs, or simply arrange his ouster in favor 
of someone more amenable.  Limiting Tajik migration to Russia 
or expelling considerable numbers of them are certainly on the 
table.  Creating problems with Tajik migrant workers could be 
the most painful for the Rakhmon regime, and social upheaval, 
68 “Slovo dnia,” Zavtra, 5 August, 2013.
69 “Nachal’nik Moskovskoi politsii Anatolii lakunin rasskazal o merakh po bor’be s nezakonnoi 
migratsiei,” Izvestiia, 7 August, 2013.
70 “Aziia-Plius:  Chistki v Moskve.  Chego zhdat’ tadzhikskomu migrant?,” Asia-Plius, 7 August, 
2013.
71 Galem Faskhutdinov and Anatoli Vaiskopf, “Moskovskie metody for’by s nelegalami bespokoiat 
Tsentral’nuiu Aziiu,” Nemetskaia Volna, 18 August, 2013.
72 “Karamzin otdykhaet.  V Kuveite izdan V tomnyi uchenyi trud E. Rakhmona ‘ Tadzhiki v zerkale 
istorii’ na arabskom iazyke,” Central Aisa.ru, 25 June, 2013.
73 “N. Krasnov, geroinovyi potok iz Tadzhikistana ne issiakaet,” CentralAsia.ru, 6 August, 2013.
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like in nearby Kyrgyzstan, could indeed erupt.  The results of this 
social/political upheaval could be manifold and unpredictable.  It 
is true that Moscow’s plans could work, and that Kremlin would 
be able to install a puppet in Dushanbe.  Or, the Kremlin’s threat 
about an upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism and instability could 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  In this case, not just Tajikistan 
but Uzbekistan could face trouble, in turn creating problems for 
Moscow itself.  While it is unclear whether Moscow would in-
deed try to deport Tajik migrants en masse or at least create seri-
ous entry barriers for them, this scenario is quite possible and the 
result could be quite different to that desired by the Kremlin.  By 
fall 2013, the Kremlin seemed to understand that for a variety of 
reasons, the project for deporting migrants, including Tajiks, on a 
massive scale would not be a realistic undertaking.  Consequent-
ly, in late August, the Kremlin “created the favorable conditions 
for Tajik migrants” allowing them to stay in Russia for 15 days 
before registration.74  
At the same time, the Kremlin believes that Tajikistan has no 
other option but to follow its bidding.  The commander of the 
Russian base refused to register their inventory with the local 
authorities or pay local taxes.75 The Kremlin proclaimed that Du-
shanbe has no other option but to stick with Russia, for the West 
already sees Tajikistan as Russia’s proxy.76  While the political 
orientation of Dushanbe is questionable, it does not mean that it 
has Dushanbe relationship with Beijing continued to be strong. 
One observer noted that “Russia is Tajikistan’s strategic partner 
only on paper and in verbal expressions.  China is slowly but 
surely becoming the most important partner,” largely be-
cause of its economic clout.77  One might assume that 
Tajikistan’s connection with China will deepen based 
on the new gas line from Turkmenistan to China, which 
would move through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.78  While 
Dushanbe has continued to flirt with variety of foreign 
partners, it has still avoided irritating Moscow and caved 
in to Russian demands.  Russia is officially allowed to 
74 “Tadzhikskim migrantam razreshili ne vstavat’ na uchet v RF 15 dnei,” Novosti Kazakhstana, 30 
August, Forum-msk.org, 30 August, 2013.
75 “Kuliab Rossiiskaia voennaia baza ne khochet registrirovat’sia v tadzhikskom BTI,” Radio Ozodi, 
5 September, 2013.
76 V. Panfilova, “Rakhmon zhdet odobreniia Kremlia Rossiiskuiu priviazali k prezidentskim 
vyboram,” Nezabisimaia Gazeta, 6 September, 2013.
77 Sadriddin Kataev, “Kitaiskii aktsent tadzhikskoi politiki,” Central Asia, 14 September, 2009.
78 “ ‘RO’: 4-ia nitka Arkadaga.  Novyi gazoprovod Turkmenistan – Kitai proidet cherez Tadzhikistan 
i Kirgiziiu,” Radio Ozodi, 5 September, 2013.
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keep its bases in Tajikistan at practically no cost.  And at the same 
time, Moscow implicitly supported Rakhmon’s re-election by al-
lowing Tajik migrants to stay in Russia.  
Conclusion
Moscow has clearly exhibited residual imperial ambitions in its 
attempt to solidify its position in the post-Soviet space.  This is 
seen especially clearly in Central Asia.  Critics of Putin’s Eur-
asian Union project have stated that Moscow wants to restore the 
USSR under a different design.  This is incorrect. Moscow has no 
military power to control Central Asia in the Soviet fashion, and 
moreover the Kremlin of the Soviet era demanded absolute con-
trol over its empire.  Still, it spent lavishly on the economic and 
cultural development of the provinces, and often at the expense 
of the Russian heartland.  This model is absolutely foreign to the 
present day Russian elite.  It wants economic benefits from the 
other states, and displays no interest in investing in Central Asia 
or elsewhere for the sake of influence alone. Allowing thousands, 
if not millions, of migrants to work in Russia is one of the few 
benefits that Moscow can offer Central Asia.  And the case of Ta-
jikistan shows that this incentive works well, although it creates 
serious internal problems in Russia.  The majority of ethnic Rus-
sians do not share the imperialist propensity of the political elite 
and see the influx of migrants as the source of many problems.  
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